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ABSTRACT. Jeremy Bentham is often thought to have set the groundwork for the modern ‘animal 
liberation’ movement, but in fact he wrote little on the subject. A full examination of  his work reveals 
a less radical position than that commonly attributed to him. Bentham was the first Western 
philosopher to grant animals equal consideration from within a comprehensive, non-religious moral 
theory, and he was a staunch defender of  animal welfare laws. But he also approved of  killing and 
using animals, as long as pointless cruelty could be avoided. The nuances of  his position are best 
brought out by comparing it to that of  Peter Singer, who draws considerably more radical practical 
conclusions. This is not primarily explained by competing formulations of  utilitarianism, however, 
but by different empirical background assumptions about the lives of  animals. 
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I. 
Jeremy Bentham is widely considered the first Western philosopher to argue that non-human 
animals (henceforth animals) deserve equal moral consideration. His impassioned plea 
against animal maltreatment has earned him a reputation as an early proponent of  animal 
rights. Though it is a label he would have most likely rejected—for reasons that mirror his 
famous dismissal of  human rights as ‘nonsense upon stilts’—his views on animal welfare 
have unquestionably exerted a huge influence on modern debates around animal ethics. 
Perhaps most obviously, a direct link can be traced from Bentham’s concern for animal 
suffering to Peter Singer’s well-known work on ‘animal liberation’ in the 1970s (Animal 
Liberation; Practical Ethics). Separated by two centuries, both thinkers display clear similarities 
in moral method and motivation. 
Yet despite his prominence in contemporary discussions on animal ethics, Bentham 
actually wrote very little on the subject. His reputation seems to be founded on a single 
footnote—indeed, part of  a footnote—in his major work, An Introduction to the Principles of  
Morals and Legislation (IPML). In it, Bentham draws an analogy between the treatment of  
slaves and that of  animals: 
 
The day has been, I grieve to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the greater 
part of  the species, under the denomination of  slaves, have been treated by the law 
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exactly upon the same footing as, in England for example, the inferior races of  
animals are still. The day may come, when the rest of  the animal creation may acquire 
those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of  
tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of  the skin is no 
reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of  a 
tormentor.1 It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of  the legs, the 
villosity of  the skin, or the termination of  the os sacrum, are reasons equally 
insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that 
should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of  reason, or, perhaps, the faculty 
of  discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, 
as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of  a day, or a week, or even a 
month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? The question 
is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? But, Can they suffer? (IPML, 282–83n) 
 
The passage has often been quoted approvingly by leading animal ethicists, (Singer, Practical 
Ethics, 56; Regan, Case for Animal Rights, 95) and some have identified here a ‘sharp departure 
from a cultural tradition that had never before regarded animals as other than things devoid 
of  morally significant interests’ (Francione, ‘Animals – Property or Persons,’ 112). However, 
few have bothered to present a full account of  Bentham’s position on animal ethics.2 When 
we take into view some of  his other, lesser-known writings, a more nuanced and less radical 
position is revealed. 
In the first part of  this paper, I attempt to reconstruct Bentham’s views on the 
permissible treatment of  animals. Far from challenging their subordination, Bentham 
approved of  killing and using animals in the name of  human welfare. Moreover, his support 
for laws against animal maltreatment was based, to an important degree, on their effect on 
human welfare. Bentham’s proposals were not extraordinary for his time – though the 
utilitarian rationale that underpinned them was. 
In the second part of  the paper, I examine this theoretical foundation closer. 
Bentham puts forward two arguments that allow him to reconcile the utilitarian consideration 
of  animal interests with their inferior treatment. The first maintains that animals fare worse 
in their natural environments; the second that they lack the mental capacities to suffer from 
domestication. In this context, I compare Bentham’s views to those of  Singer, who famously 
defends a more restrictive stance on using and killing animals. The difference between the 
two thinkers is not chiefly explained by theoretical differences in the formulation of  
utilitarianism, however, but rather by diverging empirical assumptions about the lives of  
animals. 
  
                                                 
1 Bentham here references Louis XIV’s Code Noir, issued in March 1685, which regulated the status of  slaves 
in the French West Indies. It gave slaves rights against maltreatment, and prohibited their killing. It also 
provided that slaves freed in the West Indies should become French citizens. 
2 There are some exceptions, in particular Boralevi, Bentham and the Oppressed; Boddice, A History of  Attitudes and 
Behaviours toward Animals in Eighteenth-And Nineteenth-Century Britain; and Lee, Bentham on the Moral and Legal 
Status of  Animals. 
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II. 
Bentham’s interest in animal welfare was no doubt influenced by his personal fondness for 
animals. In an unpublished manuscript, Bentham recalls an early childhood experience that 
may have triggered a life-long concern for other species: 
 
I was about 4 or 5 years old when one evening I took it into my head to amuse myself  
with putting ear-wigs in the candle. I had no malice to the poor insects: for my disgust 
at them if  I had conceived any would have led me rather to have avoided them than 
to have handled them in that matter. But the writhings of  their bodies, added to the 
little explosions made by the moisture of  their juices contained in them composed a 
scene which amused my curiosity. A servant who had the charge of  me, asked me 
what I thought the ear-wigs must suffer, and what I could have to say for myself  if  
any one that was stronger than I should serve me in the same manner. I was struck 
with remorse. I looked at the deed with horror: and now from that time I have been 
nearly as attentive to the feelings of  the brute as of  the human part of  the creation. 
(University College London collection of  Bentham manuscripts [henceforth UC], XXVII. 26.) 
 
As is well documented, this attentiveness would often manifest itself  in peculiar ways. 
Through his own recollections, and those of  his friend and executor John Bowring, we learn 
about Bentham’s affectionate behaviour towards animals. The reader is treated to stories of  
a ‘beautiful pig at Hendon, which I used to rub with my stick,’ memories of  ‘a young ass of  
great symmetry and beauty, to which I was much attached, and which grew much attached 
to me’ and details about a colony of  mice which ‘used to run up my legs, and eat crumbs 
from my lap.’ There was a cat, John Langborn by name, that was regularly invited to eat 
macaroni at Bentham’s table. The cat was knighted, installed as a Reverend, and even 
conferred a doctor’s degree by the eccentric philosopher. ‘When I knew him, in his declining 
days’ Bowring remarks drily, ‘he bore no other name than the Reverend Doctor John 
Langborn (…) Great respect was invariably shown his reverence: and it was supposed he was 
not far off  from a mitre, when old age interfered with his hopes and honours.’ As Bentham 
himself  realised: ‘my fondness for animals exposed me to many jokes’ (all quotes in Bentham, 
‘Memoirs,’ 80-1). 
But Bentham’s views on animal welfare were not merely a product of  his personal 
fondness; they were derived logically from his philosophy. Best known as the founding father 
of  classical utilitarianism, Bentham advanced the idea that the rightness of  actions is 
determined by whether they promote overall happiness. As he puts it in the famous opening 
passages of  IPML, ‘nature has placed mankind under the governance of  two sovereign 
masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do’ (IPML, 4). 
And Bentham also provides us with a method to determine the latter: in the so-called felicific 
calculus, the total amounts of  pleasure and pain caused by an action are weighed up, taking 
into consideration factors such as the duration and intensity of  the respective sensations.  
As the above quote suggests, Bentham develops his method primarily with an eye to 
human pleasure and pain. He typically speaks of  men, persons, or individuals. Yet the inherent 
logic of  the approach implies that the felicific calculus is not limited to human beings. What 
matters is the ability to experience pleasure and pain: since all sentient creatures possess this 
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ability, their welfare must also partly determine the rightness of  actions. This universal scope 
in the consideration of  interests is what leads Bentham to reach conclusions that are often 
remarkably inclusive for his time. This is true, for instance, with regard to women, 
homosexuals and non-Europeans (Boralevi, Bentham and the Oppressed). And it is equally true 
when it comes to the consideration of  the interests of  animals. 
Now, to be sure, animals do not experience the same pleasures and pains as human 
beings. After introducing the felicific calculus in IPML, Bentham offers a complex taxonomy 
of  what he calls ‘interesting perceptions.’ (IPML, Ch. V) His list includes items such as the 
pleasures of  wealth and the pleasures of  having a good name, as well as the pains of  
awkwardness and the pains of  enmity. Many of  these ‘perceptions’ cannot be experienced 
by animals. But at least with regard to what Bentham calls the pleasures and pains of  the 
senses—that is, sensations like hunger, bodily pain, sexual gratification, and so on—it seems 
clear that animals are no less sentient than human beings. To the extent that this is the case, 
it is plausible to include animals in the felicific calculus. 
This, indeed, is what Bentham suggests whenever he considers animals. In the 
aforementioned footnote, he asks why the interests of  animals ought not to be given as much 
attention as those of  human creatures, ‘allowance made for the difference in point of  
sensibility.’ And he himself  provides the answer: ‘No reason can be given.’ (IPML, 282n). So 
even though Bentham focuses on human beings—partly in view of  the complex issues raised 
by specifically human pleasure and pain—there is little doubt that the method is universal in 
scope and egalitarian in character. Since all sentient beings can experience at least some forms 
of  pleasure and pain, non-human animals enter the felicific calculus. They deserve equal 
moral consideration. 
It would be a mistake to conclude, however, that equal treatment follows from equal 
consideration. Contrary to the position that is often attributed to him, Bentham never argues 
that the suffering of  animals cannot be justified (let alone that they ought to be accorded the 
same rights as slaves, as his reference to the French law may be thought to imply). A full 
rendering of  the footnote in IPML makes this clear. The passage that immediately precedes 
the one quoted above, though often ignored, suggests a more complex view regarding the 
permissible treatment of  animals: 
 
If  the being eaten were all, there is very good reason why we should be suffered to 
eat such of  them as we like to eat: we are the better for it, and they are never the 
worse. […] If  the being killed were all, there is very good reason why we should be 
suffered to kill such as molest us: we should be the worse for their living, and they 
are never the worse for being dead. But is there any reason why we should be suffered 
to torment them? Not any that I can see (IPML, 282–83n). 
 
It becomes obvious here that Bentham is opposed to the maltreatment of  animals, but not 
necessarily to their being used or killed. At this point in the footnote, he references an 
unpublished manuscript entitled ‘Cruelty to Animals,’ which he had written around the same 
time as IPML, and which was intended to form part of  his Penal Code. Although in it he 
proposes to make animal cruelty punishable by law,3 the overall picture that emerges is one 
                                                 
3 It is a separate question—one about which there is some confusion—whether Bentham thought that animals 
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in which animals are clearly ‘subservient to the necessities’ or even just the ‘conveniences of  
man.’ Animal suffering is justified whenever it serves a useful purpose, ‘for example in the 
way of  food, physic, cloathing, conveyance or manufacture’, as part of  experiments ‘to 
promote medical or other useful knowledge’, ‘as way of  chastisement’, or to ‘defend any 
person or thing from being hurt or annoy’d.’ Remarkably, Bentham does not specify a limit 
to the suffering that may be inflicted on animals in these ways, save for the caveat that it shall 
not be inflicted wantonly, that is, ‘performed deliberately for the sake of  seeing the animal 
suffer, and not for any useful purpose’ (UC, LXXII. 214).4 
 Elsewhere, Bentham is happy to assume that animals may be used and killed 
seemingly without giving any consideration to their welfare at all. The Theory of  Legislation, 
for example, contains a long discussion of  hunting (165-7). Though Bentham lists a variety 
of  reasons to limit the right of  chase, none of  these revolve around the animals themselves. 
Similarly, his recently published writings on sex contain arguments for the toleration of  
bestiality that carefully consider its effects on human welfare, but make no mention 
whatsoever of  animal interests. (Bentham, ‘Sex’). In short, Bentham generally assumes that 
any form of  animal use that increases human welfare is permissible, as long as it is not 
wanton. This is a position that he holds with remarkable consistency throughout his life, as 
evidenced by a letter written in 1825 to the editor of  the Morning Chronicle, a paper well-
known for its scathing attacks on animal welfare legislation: 
 
Sir—I never have seen, nor ever can see, any objection to the putting of  dogs and 
other inferior animals to pain, in the way of  medical experiment, when that 
experiment has a determinate object, beneficial to mankind, accompanied with a fair 
prospect of  the accomplishment of  it. But I have a decided and insuperable objection 
to the putting of  them to pain without any such view.5 
 
What exactly is the nature of  that ‘insuperable objection’? In order to understand Bentham’s 
position, let us now turn to the reasons he provides in support of  animal welfare legislation. 
We have already touched upon one, namely that the pleasure and pain of  any sentient being 
are to be considered in the felicific calculus: ‘[w]hat makes the condition of  any creature an 
object of  concern to a benevolent mind is the circumstance of  sensibility: and not the 
circumstance of  having a black skin instead of  a white one, or four legs instead of  two’ (UC, 
LXXII. 214). Sensibility here refers simply to the ability to experience pleasure or pain (Cf. 
IPML, Ch. VI). Because all sentient beings possess this ability—albeit, as we saw, in different 
                                                 
ought to be accorded legal rights. In IPML, he bemoans ‘the insensibility of  the ancient jurists’ who had 
degraded them ‘into the class of  things.’ (IPML, 282). Yet in a manuscript composed much later, in 1826, 
Bentham seems to adopt precisely this view: ‘the only possible possessor of  a right is a person: to speak of  
a thing as possessing a right is absurdity and nonsense. In a large sense animals endued with sensation are 
termed things: and […] in a legal sense no such thing can be said to have a right: at any rate a right exercisable 
by himself: though by any man in quality of  its guardian a right may be exercised on behalf  of  the thing.’ 
(UC, XXX.080) 
4 Note that Bentham does mention that chastisement ought to be moderate, but the context makes it clear that 
he deems hard forms of  punishment to lack a useful purpose. 
5 The Chronicle, in those days an important London newspaper, had printed a series of  articles mocking the 
Irish MP and animal welfare campaigner Richard Martin (1754–1834), who, after successfully sponsoring 
the Cruel Treatment of  Cattle Act of  1822, was involved in efforts to pass a bill against live vivisection. 
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forms and to different degrees—they deserve moral consideration. Like human beings, 
animals are direct objects of  moral concern. Modern observers are therefore right to 
emphasise that Bentham saw an intrinsic worth in avoiding animal cruelty. (See e.g. Francione, 
‘Animals - Property or Persons,’ 112). 
 What is seldom noted, however, is that this intrinsic argument is only one of  several. 
Indeed, if  it were the only one, Bentham’s blanket approval of  such a wide range of  animal 
uses would be rather puzzling. For we should then expect, as part of  the felicific calculus, a 
more nuanced balancing of  animal pain and human gain for each of  the activities involved. 
But Bentham also offers two further rationales, both of  which focus on the effects of  animal 
maltreatment on human welfare. For one thing there is the potential damage that tormented 
animals can inflict on other people or things: ‘considerable mischief  is sometimes done by 
cats and other domestic animals when worried by the cruelty of  children, but more 
particularly in large towns by horned cattle driven to madness by the cruelty of  their drivers’ 
(UC, LXXII. 214). 
 More importantly, Bentham is worried about the psychological effects that acts of  
cruelty can have on those who commit them. Legislation against animal maltreatment is thus 
important to prevent the 
 
giving way to habits of  cruelty or insensibility, which when indulged are apt to lead 
men into the worst of  crimes. He who has no feeling for brutes, will have but little 
for his fellow creatures. In this point of  view, an act of  direct legislation against 
cruelties to animals is an act of  indirect legislation against Personal Injuries, Murder 
and Incendiarism; and in short against all crimes which have malice for their source 
(UC, LXXII. 214). 
 
In this passage, ‘insensibility’ does not simply denote the opposite of  sensibility, i.e. the 
capacity to experience pleasure and pain. Rather, Bentham uses it as a description of  
character.6 When people become insensible in this latter sense, they exhibit a lack of  concern 
for the welfare of  others: first animals, and then humans. Call this the Cruel Habits argument. 
This indirect, primarily human-centred reason against animal maltreatment is the one that 
figures most prominently in Bentham’s letter to the editor of  the Morning Chronicle. ‘I am 
unable to comprehend’, Bentham writes, ‘how it should be,—that to him, to whom it is a 
matter of  amusement to see a dog or a horse suffer, it should not be a matter of  like 
amusement to see a man suffer.’ Perhaps the prominence he accords to this argument could 
be explained by the fact that John Black, the editor of  the Morning Chronicle, had previously 
attacked animal protection laws as a form of  tyranny towards drovers, coachmen and other 
workers who handle animals. (See The London Magazine, Appendix to the Black Book, 458). 
By focusing on the beneficial effects on people and society, Bentham might have been trying 
to present a particularly convincing case to Black, whose newspaper was an important forum 
for progressive and utilitarian ideas. 
But Bentham was not merely being strategic. There is little doubt that he saw animal 
                                                 
6 Cf. IPML, Ch. VI, where ‘antipathetic sensibility’— ‘the propensity that a man has to derive pain from the 
happiness, and pleasure from the unhappiness, of  other sensitive beings’—is introduced as one of  the 
factors that influence sensibility in the more general sense.  
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cruelty as a stepping stone to what he considered considerably more serious crimes against 
human beings. He approvingly cites a series of  engravings by William Hogarth entitled ‘The 
Progress of  Cruelty’ (1751), which depict successive stages in the life of  a fictional figure 
called Tom Nero. Torturing dogs and other animals in his youth, Nero goes on to a life of  
theft and murder, and finally ends up hanged and publicly dissected. The cycle of  violence 
comes full circle. For Bentham, this is ‘[o]ne of  the best moral lessons that ever were 
composed’ (UC, LXXII. 214). 
And indeed, it is only when we consider this the core of  his case against animal 
maltreatment that we can begin to understand why he draws the line between permissible 
and impermissible animal treatment the way he does. Bentham never suggests that we ought 
to determine, for any given act, whether human gain outweighs animal pain – he simply 
assumes that that is generally the case. And so the permissibility of  the act hinges first and 
foremost on whether it is wanton, and therefore likely to promote insensibility and cruelty 
which will undermine human welfare in the long term.7 
In short, not only does Bentham not object to the killing and using of  animals; his 
justification for animal welfare legislation is also based to a significant degree on its likely 
effects on human welfare. Judged by the standards of  today’s animal liberation movement, 
this is not a radical position. Yet it would not have been considered particularly outlandish 
even by the standards of  his own time. By the middle of  the 18th century, the maltreatment 
of  animals had become a serious object of  moral concern. It was common for clergymen to 
lament man’s cruelty towards the so-called brute creation; compassion with animals was also 
a popular theme among poets such as Cowper, Pope, Shelley or Blake. These sentiments 
were increasingly adopted by the middle and upper classes. By the end of  the century, they 
were no longer considered eccentric (Turner, Reckoning with the Beast; Thomas, Man and the 
Natural World; Boddice, History of  Attitudes, Ch. 4). 
The Cruel Habits argument, in particular, had a long pedigree, dating back at least to 
Aquinas. It was also invoked by philosophers with an otherwise more Cartesian outlook on 
the moral status of  animals, such as Kant. In Bentham’s day, it was so popular that the moral 
lesson it conveyed was the subject of  the very first children’s books published in English 
(Turner, Reckoning with the Beast, p. 12). Even the intrinsic argument—concerning the badness 
of  pain in any sentient creature—was not a uniquely Benthamite notion. A concern for pain 
and suffering, both in humans and in animals, had already begun to take hold long before 
the publication of  IPML. In 1776, for example, a certain Reverend Humphrey Primatt had 
argued that: 
 
                                                 
7 Further evidence for this reading can be found in the Theory of  Legislation. In the aforementioned passage on 
hunting, Bentham discusses foxes as animals ‘whose value does not compensate the damage they do,’ so 
that ‘far from preserving them, it is an object to destroy them’ (167). Yet later on, he singles out ‘the chase 
of  the hare and the fox’ (428) as an activity that ought to be banned. The only way to square these statements 
is to consider the context of  the latter, which occurs in a discussion about the incitement of  cruelty. Hence 
hunting for ‘amusement or the gratification of  gluttony’ (ibid.) is to be banned, whereas useful hunting is 
not. 
Note further that Bentham is assuming that wanton infliction of  animal pain will inevitably lead to cruel habits, 
while animal suffering inflicted for a useful purpose will not. Both assumptions can be challenged. With 
regard to the latter, for example, it is sometimes suggested that slaughterhouse workers have a higher-than-
average propensity for aggression. Indeed, that butchers had cruel dispositions was also widely held in 
Bentham’s day. See Thomas, Man and the Natural World, 295. 
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Superiority of  rank or station exempts no creature from the sensibility of  pain, nor 
does inferiority render the feelings thereof  the less exquisite. Pain is pain, whether it 
be inflicted on man or beast; and the creature that suffers it, whether man or beast, 
being sensible of  the misery of  it while it lasts, suffers Evil. (Dissertation on the Duty 
of  Mercy, 7). 
 
Rather than representing a sharp departure from the prevailing opinions of  the time, then, 
Bentham was one voice in a chorus of  protest sweeping the late 18th century. His position 
on the permissible treatment of  animals, though not yet commonplace and often publicly 
ridiculed, was rather representative of  a certain section of  the educated classes. What 
distinguishes Bentham from the other writers of  the time, however, is his attempt to provide 
a foundation for this position in a systematic and non-religious philosophical framework. 
The equal moral consideration of  all sentient beings is the radical premise of  the new 
utilitarian doctrine. But how, having started from this radical premise, does Bentham arrive 
at a fairly conventional position regarding the permissible treatment of  animals? 
III. 
To answer this question, we now must take a closer look at the structure of  Bentham’s moral 
theory. Throughout his writings on the subject, we find two arguments that enable him to 
reconcile the idea of  equal moral consideration with the subordination of  animals. The first 
revolves around the contrast between killing and natural death. The death that animals 
experience at our hands, Bentham argues, is usually less painful than the one they might have 
had in their natural environments. Hence killing animals does not increase the total suffering 
in the world, but rather decreases it (IPML, 282–3n; Theory of  Legislation, 66). In fact, in this 
regard there is little difference between humans and animals: ‘what the man himself  suffere’d 
who is killed […] is commonly less than he would have suffer’d by a natural death.’ (UC, 
LXXII. 214). This view seems to assume some version of  Epicurus’ classic argument that 
death is not a harm to the person who dies. We cannot suffer once we cease to exist, because 
existence is a precondition for having interests. Hence the only suffering that matters is that 
which we experience before and while we die. 
 But between humans and animals, Bentham sees a crucial difference, and here is 
where the second argument comes into play. While human beings possess the mental 
capacities to project their lives into the future, animals ‘have none of  those long-protracted 
anticipations of  future misery which we have.’ (IPML, 282–83n ). In a passage explaining the 
importance of  expectations of  security in Theory of  Legislation, Bentham stresses the contrast:  
 
We must consider that man is not like the animals, limited to the present, whether as 
respects suffering or enjoyment; but that he is susceptible of  pains and pleasures by 
anticipation; and that it is not enough to secure him from loss, but it is necessary to 
guarantee him, as far as possible, against future loss (110). 
 
In other words, a general presumption against human killing may be derived from the painful 
anticipation of  the future that we would experience if  our security were not guaranteed. But 
this argument can evidently only apply to beings with the mental capacities to consider the 
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future, and to infer from the killing of  others a risk to their own life. Because animals 
purportedly lack these capacities, they suffer no harm by becoming aware that other animals 
are killed. Nor are the animals whose lives we take harmed, since, as per Bentham’s first 
argument, being killed is better than dying a natural death. Both arguments taken together 
establish that we may deprive animals of  their lives because ‘we are the better for it, and they 
are never the worse’ (IPML, 282–83n ). 
Note, then, that the superior mental capacities of  humans do play an important role 
in Bentham’s theory. Despite the famous line in IPML that places the ability to suffer above 
the abilities to speak and reason, self-consciousness and rationality matter rather a lot. Giving 
the interests of  all sentient beings equal moral consideration means taking into account the 
ways in which higher mental capacities enable different (and stronger) kinds of  pleasure and 
pain. And once we do take this into account, Bentham maintains, there can be no objection 
to killing and using ‘inferior’ animals in the name of  human welfare. 
 At this point, we should step back to evaluate the coherence and plausibility of  the 
theory as a whole. We have seen that Bentham’s views on treating animals are less radical 
than they initially appear – or, at any rate, more complex than the views commonly attributed 
to him. But it is not clear whether his permissive stance on killing and using animals is 
consistent with the arguments he provides to support it. In this context, it is helpful to 
contrast Bentham’s views to those of  Peter Singer, who has not only provided the founding 
philosophical statement of  the modern animal liberation movement, but who in doing so 
has also drawn most clearly on the Benthamite tradition. 
 Like Bentham, Singer derives his concern for animal welfare from a utilitarian moral 
framework. There are, of  course, some important differences in the formulation of  the 
theory. Whereas the classical (hedonistic) utilitarianism espoused by Bentham puts pleasure 
and pain centre-stage, Singer advances a preference theory of  value. From this latter point 
of  view, what ought to be promoted is the satisfaction of  preferences, rather than merely 
pleasure as such. Despite this and other differences, both approaches clearly overlap with 
regard to our subject-matter.8 Singer considers an animal’s ability to experience pain a 
necessary and sufficient condition for it to have preferences: at a minimum, a preference not 
to be subjected to pain. Both approaches are also egalitarian in the sense that they give equal 
moral consideration to the welfare of  all sentient creatures. Yet in spite of  these theoretical 
similarities, Singer draws considerably more far-reaching practical inferences: 
 
Once nonhuman animals are recognized as coming within the sphere of  equal 
consideration of  interests, it is immediately clear that we must stop treating hens as 
machines for turning grain into eggs, rats as living toxicology testing kits, and whales 
as floating reservoirs of  oil and blubber. All these practices and the list could be 
continued for a long time are based on treating animals as things to be used for our 
advantage, without any thought being given to the interests of  the animals 
themselves. The inclusion of  animals within the sphere of  equal consideration could 
                                                 
8 For a more general comparison of  Bentham’s and Singer’s philosophies, see Dardenne, ‘From Bentham to 
Singer.’ Note that I shall not consider in this paper Singer’s more recent move toward hedonistic 
utilitarianism in De Lazari-Radek and Singer, Point of  View, primarily because he has not yet addressed the 
question of  animal welfare explicitly from this perspective. For an account of  what his new position may 
imply for animal welfare, see Paez, ‘Posséder des intérêts.’ 
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not leave such practices intact. (Animal Liberation or Animal Rights, 5) 
 
This generates a puzzle. If  the theoretical starting points of  both thinkers are so similar, why 
do they end up reaching such different conclusions regarding the permissible treatment of  
animals? The answer, I believe, is that Bentham’s views contain at their core a tension that 
can only be resolved by making highly idealised, if  not outright implausible, empirical 
assumptions about the lives of  animals. To understand this tension, recall that Bentham never 
seriously considers the possibility that for a given useful (as opposed to wanton) act, animal 
pain may outweigh human pleasure. This position may seem surprising, for one can easily 
imagine practices which, though useful, provide only a modest increase in human welfare 
(think, for example, of  the practice of  force-feeding ducks to make foie gras. While foie gras 
may taste better than regular liver, and thus increase human pleasure, it is not clear that this 
gain in welfare outweighs the suffering of  the ducks). 
Now, to be sure, what I have been calling ‘Bentham’s position on the permissible 
treatment of  animals’ is not a fundamental philosophical position, but rather a rule of  thumb, 
a general sketch that can form the basis of  sensible legislation. It is grounded in calculations 
that may be subject to change. But in order to maintain this position, it must be true that 
animal suffering, taken by itself, is usually not sufficiently weighty to rule out an act that 
generates human utility.9 Only when we throw human suffering into the equation—through 
the causal mechanism outlined by the Cruel Habits argument—is the balance of  the felicific 
calculus tipped. Yet this presupposes rather implausible assumptions regarding the (intrinsic) 
suffering involved in using and killing animals. The comparison with Singer illustrates the 
point. 
 Consider first the question of  killing animals. Both Bentham and Singer accept that 
killing human beings is generally worse than killing animals, for reasons to do with their 
mental capacities. As we have seen before, Bentham objects to murder on account of  the 
terror that we would experience if  we knew that we could be killed. Animals, on the other 
hand, cannot experience this kind on anxiety: ‘to make amends for their inferiority in other 
respects other animals have the privilege of  not knowing that they are to die. Killing other 
animals therefore is nothing’ (UC, LXXII. 214). 
Singer’s case against killing humans is similar. From a preference utilitarian point of  
view, what matters is the fact of  self-consciousness. Murder would frustrate the most basic 
interest that a self-conscious being can have: the interest in continuing to exist. Because non-
self-conscious animals do not have this interest, killing them may be justified when they are 
killed painlessly, and their death does not cause suffering to other animals.10 Hence like 
                                                 
9 The issue is compounded by the fact that Bentham measures pleasure and pain on a single metric for all 
sentient creatures. J.S. Mill’s qualitative hedonism—the idea that it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a 
pig satisfied—may perhaps offer a way to attach greater weights to human pleasure, but it is not one available 
to Bentham. He must instead assume that animal suffering is small in universal terms. 
10 Singer adds a further condition, namely that ‘the killing of  one animal makes possible its replacement by 
another who would not have otherwise lived.’ (Singer, Practical Ethics, p. 104). Bentham never considers this 
idea, even though his theory seems to require it: by killing an animal we decrease the total amount of  
happiness in the world, making it necessary to counter-balance this killing by bringing into existence a 
similarly happy being. But since rearing animals for human use typically involves their replacement, 
Bentham’s failure to consider this condition does little to explain the difference between his and Singer’s 
stance on the permissible treatment of  (domesticated) animals. 
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Bentham, Singer relies on a distinction between beings with higher and lower mental 
capacities, with the killing of  the latter being permissible under certain conditions. 
Despite the resemblance in the theoretical outlook of  both thinkers, their accounts 
rely on drastically different empirical assumptions about the mental lives of  sentient beings. 
The disagreement is not about whether human beings can lack the mental capacities required 
to fear death: Bentham held more permissive views than Singer with regard to the killing of  
new-born infants, for example.11 But Bentham never seems to entertain the possibility that 
some animals possess higher mental capacities. Singer, in contrast, has emphasised the degree 
to which some animals may be persons, that is, self-conscious beings with a sense of  the past 
and the future. Apes, whales and dolphins are obvious candidates, and Singer cites plenty of  
studies to this effect. (Practical Ethics, Ch. 5). Future research may end up expanding the 
community of  persons to an even wider range of  animals, including pigs, monkeys, birds or 
octopuses. 
Whether Bentham would have disapproved of  killing these animals, had he been 
familiar with the research that is available to us now, is a matter of  speculation. In any case, 
his own notion of  higher mental capacities is less demanding than Singer’s, since it requires 
only the ability to experience pain or anxiety when faced with the prospect of  being killed. 
Bentham may have been right to assume that the abstract idea of  death is no source of  distress 
to most animals. As the journalist Michael Pollan once put it, ‘in a bovine brain the concept 
of  nonexistence is blissfully absent.’ (Pollan, ‘An Animal’s Place’). Be that as it may, it does 
not follow that animals cannot experience distress when faced with the concrete prospect of  
being killed. Bentham seems to assume that animals are killed suddenly and painlessly, but 
then as today, this is far removed from the reality of  commercial meat production. The 
process of  being driven to a slaughterhouse to be killed may take several days, during which 
the animal in question undoubtedly experiences stress and anxiety. The animal’s inferior 
intelligence may perhaps be a cause of  even greater anxiety than that of  a rational being 
cognisant of  its predicament, because it involves more uncertainty and confusion. 
Bentham also assumes that the only potential harm that a being can experience when 
others are killed is fear for its own life. This again oversimplifies matters greatly. The fact that 
some animals have social interests, much like humans, cannot go unnoticed by even the most 
casual observer. In the wild, young animals can be harmed when their mothers are killed, 
often condemning them to a slow and painful death. And many domesticated animals, 
including for instance cows, are often visibly distressed (and even appear to grieve) when 
their young are killed. These are rather obvious observations, even in the absence of  the 
scientific evidence that is available to us today, but they are ignored by Bentham. 
When we turn to the question of  using (as opposed to killing) animals, his empirical 
assumptions seem equally questionable. As we have seen, Bentham allows while Singer 
generally rejects the use of  animals for food, clothing, or medical research. It is tempting to 
assume that Bentham did not know what we know today, namely the extent to which using 
animals inflicts pain on them. For example, he could not have anticipated the practices 
involved in mass factory farming, which the modern animal liberation movement has so 
                                                 
11 ‘It possesses not yet any faculty as that of  reflection: it has no anticipation of  the future: it has no recollection 
of  the past: scarcely can it be said to be possessed of  so much as the faculty of  consciousness. […] Of  a 
hundred thousand new-born infants, the existence might be exterminated without a quantity of  suffering 
equal to that which is commonly produced by the drawing of  one tooth.’ See Jeremy Bentham, ‘Sex’, 52. 
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vigorously denounced. But as Singer points out, even in Bentham’s time rearing and 
slaughtering animals for human use inevitably involved great suffering. Contrary to what one 
might assume, it was probably an ‘even more horrific affair than it is today’ (Animal Liberation, 
213). Sheep were often skinned while they were still conscious. Oxen were driven for days 
on bleeding stumps, and stunned by being hit repeatedly with a poleaxe. Horses were literally 
beaten and ridden to death; the streets of  London were filled with ‘horse-boilers’ waiting to 
lay claim to the carcasses of  the collapsed animals (See E.S. Turner, All Heaven in a Rage, 143-
6). In light of  these circumstances, Singer concludes that Bentham chose to ‘turn [his] gaze 
away from the ugly reality’ and ‘lower [his] normal standard of  argument.’ (Animal Liberation, 
213).  
How might Bentham’s position be redeemed? The key to any plausible defence lies 
in his first argument for killing and eating animals, namely the claim that they would have 
fared worse in their natural environments. Bentham insists that the ‘death they suffer in our 
hands commonly is, and always may be, a speedier, and by that means a less painful one, than 
that which would await them in the inevitable course of  nature’ (IPML, pp. 282–83n). The 
same rationale that applies to killing can also be generalised to the use of  animals. Because 
living in the wild inevitably involves suffering—hunger, fear of  predators, lack of  veterinary 
care, and so on—Bentham might simply be assuming that domestication is bound to improve 
the felicific calculus. Hence any animal use would be justified as long as it involves less pain 
than the state of  nature. 
In order to work, the argument must rest on two premises. The first is a theoretical 
commitment to an interpretation of  utilitarianism that is not maximising in the standard 
sense. Maximising utilitarianism holds that an act is right if  there is no alternative act that 
produces more welfare. Despite having coined the term ‘maximising,’ Bentham is generally 
thought to endorse a less demanding version of  utilitarianism, according to which an act is 
right if  it improves welfare, or if  it improves it compared to a situation in which the act is 
not performed.12 Applied to the question of  animal welfare, then, Bentham might hold that 
our treatment of  animals is permissible if  it produces a positive balance of  pleasure over 
pain, or if  it constitutes an improvement against a counterfactual baseline. The act would still 
be right even if there were alternative ways of  treating animals that inflicted less pain on them 
(for instance, more humane ways to rear or kill cattle).  
Of  course, Bentham must also make an empirical assumption, namely that most of  
the existing practices of  domestication represent a comparative improvement in utility over 
life in the wild. He is mostly happy to assume this without argument, echoing the prevailing 
view of  the time.13 And in an idealised form this is not an implausible assumption: recent 
research suggests that wild animals experience more stress than their domesticated 
counterparts, provided the latter are well cared for (Wilcox, ‘Bambi or Bessie’). But that they 
were well cared for could hardly be taken for granted in Bentham’s day. Factory farming, for 
                                                 
12 The former, satisficing interpretation is most widely attributed to Bentham, although there is also evidence 
for the latter interpretation. For a recent discussion, see Gustafsson, ‘Bentham’s Binary Form.’ 
13 ‘In the 18th century’, Keith Thomas points out, ‘it was widely urged that domestication was good for animals; 
it civilized them and increased their numbers’ (Man and the Natural World, 20). However, there is one passage 
in Bentham’s body of  work where he seems to express doubts. In the Theory of  Legislation, he observes that 
‘[a]rtificial death may be rendered less painful than natural death by simple processes, well worth the trouble 
of  being studied, and of  becoming an object of  police’ (10). This suggests an awareness that some of  
practices of  the time could not be considered a comparative improvement over the natural counterfactual. 
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instance, dates back to the Elizabethan period, where pigs were kept in such close room that 
they were forced to lie on their bellies without being able to move. As a contemporary 
observer noted: ‘they feed in pain, lie in pain, and sleep in pain’ (Thomas, Man and the Natural 
World, 94). Given the brutal character of  animal husbandry in the 18th century, Bentham must 
have set the comparative baseline very low for his argument to go through. 
Here as elsewhere, Bentham invokes rather implausible empirical assumptions about 
the lives of  animals. Had his analysis been more nuanced in this regard, it would have been 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that animal pain carries sufficient intrinsic weight to play a 
much larger role in the felicific calculus, even when it does not—as per the Cruel Habits 
argument—entail human pain. This would have called for more radical restrictions on the 
use and killing of  animals, as the criterion for the permissibility of  these acts could no longer 
rest primarily on whether they are wanton. 
 
IV. 
Bentham’s views on animal welfare are more ambiguous than generally assumed. He was a 
tireless advocate of  animal welfare laws, and he was the first Western philosopher to provide 
a systematic, non-religious philosophical framework that gave equal moral consideration to 
all species. The key to Bentham’s position is the universal experience of  pleasure and pain: 
‘the poor worm you tread on in corporal sufferance feels a fancy as great as when a hero 
dies’ (UC, LXXII. 214).14 Or, in the more succinct words of  Humphrey Primatt and Peter 
Singer, ‘pain is pain.’(Primatt, A Dissertation on the Duty, 18; Singer, Animal Liberation, 18). But 
Bentham never argued that animals ought to be given the same protections as people, nor 
would he have supported most of  the demands of  the modern animal liberation movement. 
On the contrary, he believed that animals may be killed and used in the name of  human 
welfare. 
A distinction between higher and lower mental capacities explains his insistence that 
animals may be deprived of  their lives without harming them. Singer employs a similar 
distinction to explain the wrongness of  killing self-conscious beings. But unlike Singer, and 
despite his affection for ‘intellectual’ cats, Bentham never seems to entertain the possibility 
that other species may possess the mental capacities that make killing humans such a serious 
wrong. And again unlike Singer, Bentham assumes that animals may be used for most 
purposes without making them worse off. Because he sets the counterfactual threshold for 
permissible animal suffering low, namely to reflect what he believes to be the harsh reality of  
animal life in the wild, nearly all animal uses can be justified. His only concession seems to 
be the insistence on banning pointless cruelty. 
As I have argued, this position can only be maintained at the cost of  rather 
implausible views about the suffering involved in using and killing animals. It is not clear why 
Bentham held these views. Was he, a self-professed hermit from a privileged social class, 
unware of  the harsh conditions in which animals were kept in his time? Did he deliberately 
turn his gaze away from the ‘ugly reality,’ as Singer has suggested? Or was he unwilling to 
draw more radical practical conclusions for fear of  discrediting the utilitarian movement in 
                                                 
14 Bentham is here presumably referencing William Shakespeare’s Measure to Measure (III.i.85): ‘And the poor 
beetle, that we tread upon/ In corporal sufferance finds a pang as great/ As when a giant dies.’ 
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the eyes of  others? We do not know. Although his views do not live up to the radical potential 
of  his moral theory, Bentham nevertheless deserves his place in the history of  animal ethics. 
For the fact that these views no longer strike us as radical is owed, at least in some degree, to 
the ideas that he helped to set in motion. 
 
 
Bibliography 
Bentham, Jeremy. ‘Letter to the Editor,’ The Morning Chronicle, March 4th, 1825. 
 
Bentham, Jeremy. ‘Memoirs of  Bentham Part II and Analytical Index,’ in: The Works of  
Jeremy Bentham, vol. 11. Published under the Superintendence of  his Executor, John 
Bowring. Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843. 
 
Bentham, Jeremy. Theory of  Legislation. Translated from the French of  Etienne Dumont by 
R. Hildreth. London: Truebner, 1864. 
 
Bentham, Jeremy. An Introduction to the Principles of  Morals and Legislation, ed. J. H. Burns and 
H. L. A. Hart. London: The Athlone Press, 1970. 
 
Bentham, Jeremy. ‘Sex,’ in: Selected Writings. Edited and with an introduction by Stephen G 
Engelmann. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2011. 
 
Boddice, Rob. A History of  Attitudes and Behaviours toward Animals in Eighteenth-And 
Nineteenth-Century Britain. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2008. 
 
Boralevi, Lea Campos. Bentham and the Oppressed. Berlin & New York: de Gruyter, 1984. 
 
Dardenne, Emilie. ‘From Jeremy Bentham to Peter Singer,’ Revue d’Etudes Benthamiennes, Vol. 
7 (2010), DOI: 10.4000/etudes-benthamiennes.204.  
 
De Lazari-Radek, Katarzyna and Peter Singer. The Point of  View of  the Universe. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014. 
 
Francione, Gary. ‘Animals - Property or Persons?’ in: Animal Rights. Current Debates and New 
Directions, ed. Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004. 
 
Gustafsson, Johan. ‘Bentham’s Binary Form of  Maximizing Utilitarianism,’ British Journal for 
the History of  Philosophy (forthcoming). 
 
Lee, Jadran. Bentham on the Moral and Legal Status of  Animals, PhD dissertation, University of  
Chicago, 2002. 
 
Paez, Eze. ‘Posséder des intérêts sans avoir de désirs, concevoir une chose comme 
 15 
mauvaise sans que des intérêts soient en jeu. La valeur négative de la mort dans 
l’utilitarisme hédoniste de Peter Singer’ in: Peter Singer et la libération animale. Quarante ans plus 
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